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Macroeconomic  policy and sequencing issues increasingly have
been addressed explicitly in the design of recent adjustment
loans, but there still is scope for: (I) strengthening the analytical
framework and macroeconomic policy conditionality in adjust-
ment loans, and (2) greater realism about the time and external
resources needed to achieve adjustment and growth objectives.
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This paper is a product of the Macrocconomic  Adjustment and Growth Division, Country Economics Department.
It was prepared as part of a larger effort in PRE to assess the World Bank's experiencc with adjustment lend:ng and
was a background paper for :he Bank's Report on Adjustment Lending 11: Policiesfor  thze  Recovery of Growth,
submitted to the Bank's Board on Mlarch  6, 1990. The paper deals with the theoretical macroeconomic  underpinning
of adjustment programs and presents the results of empirical work on the design and implementation of Bank-
supported adjustment loans.  Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
Washington, DC 20433. Please contact AludiaOropesa, room NII-019,extension  39075 (41 pages with tables).
Drawing on conditionality and implementation  policy, including public expenditure reform, has been
information lor  184 World Bank adjustment loans to  an important focus of the Bank's adjustment lending.
62 countries during the 1980s, Jaspersen and Shariff  Rclatively Icss emphasis has been given to monctary
examine the macrocconomic underpinnings of Bank-  and exchange  rate policies which have been a central
supported adjustment programs.  Thcy conclude that  focus of INIF  programs.  Implemcntation of supply-
macrocconomic policy reform and improved macro-  side sectoral policies has been strongly affected by
cconomic performance are critical to successful  macrocconomic performance. W'herc  macro balance
implementation and sustainability of structural  has not been reestablished, implementation rates have
reform.  been lower for all conditions.  Where progress in
climinating imbalance is taking place, rceform  inertia
Reducing macrocconomic imbalances is espe-  has strengthened even aftcr loan disbursement has
cially important for tradc rcform. If inflation is not  been completed.
reduced to a manageable level, therc is a danger that
the cxchangc rate will be used as a nominal anchor  Loan design has also becn an important determi-
for domestic prices.  If sustained over a long period,  nant of implementation antd  sustainability of reform.
this may precipitate a balance of payments crisis and  Where issues of sequencing have becn built into the
make it impossiblc to liberalizc urade.  design of adjustment programs, the implementation  of
sectoral reform has been stronger. Adjustment loan
Reducing macrocconomic imbalances  also has an  conditions which are precisely defined and legally
important bearing on implementation of sectoral  binding for tranche releasc have had the highest rates
reforms. To the cxteni that the govement  cannot  of implementation. For adjus:ment loans with a large
reducc its fiscal deficit by increasing its own savings,  numbcr of conditions, impilmentation has becn
there is a greater likelihood that it will cut investment  highest for the "corc" conditions that have been the
in infrastructure to support sectoral rcstructuring.  most critical for success of the program.
Prolonged high rcal rates of intercst that result from
unsuccessful stabilization efforts can hurt private  After looking at recent experiencc with macro-
investment and the restructuring of sectoral produc-  economic con(litionality, the authors conclude that
tion.  If fiscal imbalances have not been eliminated  macroeconomic policy and sequencing issues
before liberalizing the financial systcm, it is likely  increasingly have been addressed explicitly in the
that the govemment will continue to rely on adminis-  design of recent adjustment loans, but there still is
trative controls to finance the public sector deficit,  scope for:  (I)  strengthening the analytical framcwork
undermining financial sector reform.  and macroeconomic policy conditionality in adjust-
ment loans, and (2) greater realism about the time and
Analysis of thc Bank's adjustment loans indicates  external resourLes  needed to achieve adjustmcnt and
that mac,occonomic conditionality has been relatively  grox%  di objectives.
important  and has increased ovcr timc.  Fiscal
Thc PRE Working  Paper  Scries disseminates  thc findings  of work under  way  in thc Bank's Policy,  Rcscarch. and Extemal
AffairsComplex. An  objective ofthe scries ic  to get these findings out quickly, even if pi  escitations arc Icss  than fully polished.
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especially helpful in  providing this information.THE MACROECONOMIC  UNDERPINNINGS  OF ADJUSTMENT  LENDING
I.  Introduction%  Support  of  Macroeconomic  Objectives
Under  Adjustment  Lending  (AL)
One feature of quick-disbursing  adjustment lending  which
distinguishes it from investment lending,  which disburses more slowly, is its
greater capacity to transfer hard currency resources.  Adjustment loans
maximize the present value of net transfets from the Bank to the recipient
country for a given level of commitment.  For this reason adjustment lending
is the  most appropriate instrument for assisting a country which is
experiencing balance of payments problems.  In the absence of external
imbalanct or if such imbalance is the consequence of a transitory terms of
trade shock  which does not require a re-alignment of macroeconomic policies
(i.e.,  the shock is short-lived  and can be covered out of reserves or by
short-term,  compensatory borrowing), there is no strong rationale for the Bank
to employ adjustment lending rather than investment lending since the latter
is generally  more effective  where macroeconomic objectives are not of high
priority and  where shorter-term compensatory financing is available from other
sources.  If the external shock is permanent, or the balance of payments
problem is the consequence of internal imbalance stemming from mismanagement
of domestic macroeconomic policies in the first  place, and therL is a need to
reorient such policies, adjustment lending  may be more appropriate.
It is for this reason that the Bank has emphasized that given the
quick- disbursing nature of adjustment lending, it is important that there be
"a  clear and documented understanding  with the government on its overall
structural adjustment program, including short-term stabilization as wel'l  as
longer-term development objectives'.1  To ensure this, the Bank has
recommended in the two recent reports on adjustment lending that a more
explicit and monitorable approach be taken for Board presentation and
subsequent tranche release.  In particular, "both  should be dependent on a
documented  management judgment that appropriate action  was being taken to
reduce external and internal financial instability.3  This judgment, it was
noted, "should  take into account evidence of actual performance as indicated
by available short-term  economic and financial indicators  and also by the
progress recently  made in adopting relevant reforms indicated in the general
understanding on the country's adjustment  program.  The judgment and
supporting evidence  would be included in the President's  Report for proposed
adjustment loans and in the notification to the Board of all subsequent
tranche releases."
The reports on adjustment lending  have also noted the circumstances
which would tend to increase the likelihood that a government's program be
implemented over the  medium-term.  One such circumstance is that
"the  government publicly propose and justify the overall strategy of the
adjustment program."  Without this, it  was agreed, the risk of weak
implementation and subsequent reversal  would be high.
1  This approach is to be monitored for 18 months starting in September
1988,  after which  management  would  reassess  its adequacy with  respect to
improving performance.- 2 -
Similarly,  it  was emphasized  that  adjustment  programs  need  to be
realistic.  They  hav  to  be "restrictive  enough  to be consistent  with the
financing  available,  but  not so restrictive  that  it is likely  to prove
socially  and  politically  unacceptable  and  therefore  unsustainable."  This  is
especially  important  for  countries  with a large  external  debt  overhang.
Greater  realism  was recommended  in two  additional  areas:  fuller
recognition  of (a)  the  effects  of the  global  economic  environment;  and
(b)  the  time  that  might  be  needed  for  supply  responses.  While  improved
economic  performance  over  the  medium-term  is  clearly  a  major  objective  of
adjustment  lending,  unexpected  external  and  internal  shocks  can  adversely
affect  performance.  There  are  also  response  lags  following  policy  reform
which  are  ex ante  of  uncertain  duration  that  will determine  the  timing  of the
impact  on actual  economic  performance.  It is for  these  two  reasons  that
policy  (and  not  performance)  conditionality  is  called  for. Only  over  the
medium-term  would  the  Bank look  for  and  require  as a condition  an improvement
in  performance.  In a series  of adjustment  operations,  the  policy  reform
agenda  would  of course  be adjusted  in response  to  economic  performance  and
progress  in  achieving  program  objectives.
The  most  recent  report  on adjustment  lending  concluded  that  the
relative  macroeconomic  performance  of  AL countries  was better  than  that  of
those  which  had  not  received  such  loans  despite  the  fact  that  the  former
suffered  greater  external  shocks. The  exception  to  this  general  finding  was
the  Sub-Saharan  Africa  (SSA)  and  highly-indebted  countries  (HICs),  where
improvement  in relative  performance  between  adjustment  lending  recipients  and
non-adjustment  lending  countries  is  weak.  It  was concluded  that  while  the
SSAs  and  the  HICs  had  been  successful  in reducing  their  external  current
account  deficits  after  adjustment  lending  had  been  initiated,  internal
imbalances  were greater  and  there  was  no significant  progress  toward
resumption  of adequate  growth  (in  the  absence  of adjustment  programs,  of
course,  this  situation  is likely  to  have  been  much  worse). Changes,  not  only
in the  design  of  adjustment  programs  and  their  implementation,  but  also in  the
existing  debt  strategy  were recommended.
Concerns  have  been  expressed  at  Board  discussions  in recent  years
over  Bank initiatives  in the  macroeconomic  area  which  might  duplicate  Fund
activities.  Staff  have  clarified  that  because  of the  requirements  of
structural  adjustment,  the  Bank  has,  of  necessity,  become  increasingly
concerned  with a  wide range  of  macroeconomic  issues. Because  the  success  of
its  adjustment  lending  will,  to a  considerable  extent,  be determined  by the
existence  of a stable  macroeconomic  environment,  the  Bank  must  evalvate  the
macroeconomic  policy  framework  within  which  such  lending  is  taking  place.
Moreover,  the  Bank  as  a  market-based  institution  must  be concerned  with  the
creditworthiness  of IBRD  borrowers  and  must  assess  their  macroeconomic
management.  The  recent  agreement  between  the  Bank  and  the  Fund  acknowledges
explicitly  the  importance  of these  issues  to  the  Bank (see  paragraph  10,  R89-
45  of  March  31,  1989).-3-
This  paper  assesses  the  Bank's  experience  supporting  improved
macroeconomic  management  through  adjustment  lending. It attempts  to draw
conclusions  about  the  macroeconomic  framework  for  such lending  and  about  the
design  and  implementation  of  macroeconomic  conditionality  in adjustment
lending.
Section  II presents  a conceptual  framework  for  macroeconomic  policy
under  adjustment  lending  which links  stabilization,  adjustment  and,  where
relevant,  debt  reduction. It describes  the  linkages  between  macroeconomic
policies,  i.e.,  expenditure-reducing  policies,  expenditure-switching  policies,
and  supply-side  policies,  and  the  sequencing  of reforms  at different  stages  of
the  adjustment  process. It concludes  by placing  the  macroeconomic  obiectives
of adjustment  within  the  context  of a taxonomy  of  program  design  for  a typical
adjustment  operation.
Section  III focuses  on the  Bank's  experience  with the  design  aad
implementation  of macroeconomic  conditionality  in 184  adjustment  loans  to  62
AL countries  during  the  past  decade. It identifies  some  of the  key
operational  issues  concerning  the  macroeconoiic  framework  for  these  loans  and
draws  conclusions  about  how  the  Bank  can  more effectively  support  improved
design  and  implementation  of this  framework.
Section  IV  examines  for  macroeconomic  content  a sample  of 23
adjustment  operations  carried  out  by the  Bank  in FY89,  the  most recent  year
for  which  data  is available. It identifies  those  FY89  operations  which
illustrate  "best  practice"  Bank-wide  in supporting  improved  macroeconomic
policy  management. It concludes  with a summing  up of the  major  issues  faced
by the  Bank  in such  operations.
II.  The  Conceptual  Framework  of  Adjustment:
Program  Design  - A Taxonomy  of  Adl"stment  Policies
Stylized  Facts
During  the  1970s  and  early  1980s  many  of the  countries  which  became
candidates  for  Bank  adjustment  lending  were  pursuing  expansionary  demand
management  policies. Such  countries  typically  had large  fiscal  deficits,
rapid  monetary  expansion,  accelerating  inflation,  unsustainable  current
account  deficits  and  a large  stock  of external  debt.  In a  number  of these  the
cumulative  effects  of  weak institutions  and  policy-induced  distortions  in
factor  and  goods  markets  had created  rigidities  in  these  countries'  economies
reducing  their  capacity  to adjust  to  external  shocks.
Distortion-inducing  policies  included  price  controls,  over-valued
exchange  rates,  administrative  controls  on interest  rates  which  resulted  in
negative  real  rates  of interest,  and  large  fiscal  deficits. Fiscal  defic'ts
were in  many  cases  the  consequence  of external  shocks,  but  also  of
unsustainable  high levels  of government  spending,  inelastic  tax  systems,
direct subsidies  to state  enterprises,  indirect  subsidies  to consumers
through  reduced  prices  of goods  and  services  provided  by the  public  sector,
and  of  high interest  payments  on external  and  internal  debt.-4-
D'stortions  created  by these  policies  were frequently  compounded  by a
trade  regime  which relied  heavil-  on quantitative  restrictions  to  protect
domestic  industry  and  by adminis-rative  controls  at the  sectoral  level.
Distortions  in the  financial  sector,  frequently  the  consequence  of
macroeconomic  imbalances,  were especially  serious  because  of their  far-
reaching  adverse  impact  on the  allocation  of resources  throughout  the  economy.
Figure  1 shows  a typical  country  where  adjustment  is required.
Policy-induced  distortions  result  in the  economy  operating  below  the
production  possibility  frontier  (PPF). The  level  of  expenditure  (E)  exceeds
current  production  (Y). The result  is  an "ex  ante"  excess  demand  for  both
tradables  (T)  and  nontradables  (N). The  former  results  in  a current  account
deficit  equal  to T Tc.  The latter  gives  vise  to an increase  in the  price  of
nontradables  (Pn)  Pn absolute  terms  and  relative  to  prices  of tradables  which
are  determined  in  world  markets. The rise  in  the  price  of nontradables  will
lead  to a real  appreciation  of the  exchange  rate.
If the resulting  current  account  deficit  can  be financed  --  either  by
borrowing  abroad  or by reducing  reserves,  the  real  appreciat_on  will stick,
switching  expenditure  from  nontradables  to tradables  and switching  production
from  tradables  to nontradables.  The  consequence  is  that  the  excess  demand  for
nontradables  will be corrected  at the  expense  of a larger  current  account
deficit. There  will  be no inflation,  only  a  once-for-all  rise  in the  price  of
nontradables.  If external  funds  are  not  available,  the  nominal  exchange  rate
will  depreciate  offsetting  the  increase  in the  price  of  nontradables  and
thereby  preventing  the  real  appreciation.  In  this second  case,  as long  as  the
excess  demand  persists,  a process  of continuous  devaluation  and  inflation  will
take  place. This  is the  current  situation  in  many of the  countries  that  are
now receiving  ALs.
For  a country  in this  situation  adjustment  involves  two  actions. On
the  one  hand,  aligning  aggregate  demand  and  aggregate  supply,  that  is,
stabilizing  the  economy. On the  other  hand,  bringing  about  structural  changes
that  increase  the  level  of efficiency  and  flexibility  of the  economy.
Typically,  a structural  adjustment  program  has three  objectives:
(a)  a reduction  of  aggregate  demand;  (b)  a change  in relative  prices  and
(c)  an increase  in  output.
Reduction  of Aggregate  Demand
Although  in  the  medium-term  the  objective  is to "grow"  out  of the
crisis,  it is  not  usually  possible  to raise  production  enough  to correct  the
initial  eixcess  demand. The  removal  of distortions  may even  have a  negative
initial  impact  on income  if rigidities  have  built-up  in the  economy.
Therefore,  the  major  emphasis  in  the  short  run  will fall  on reducing
expenditure.  Adjustment  lending  facilitates  this  in two  ways.  First,
adjustment  programs  become  more  politically  acceptable  because  expenditures
will not  have  to be  cut  as  much as  would  be the  case  in  the  absence  of such









To succeed,  expenditure  reduction  must  be selective. Too large  a
reduction  in  investment  jeopardizes  the  prospects  for  future  growth. Too
large  a re!i^tion  in private  or  public  consumption  imposes  an unacceptable
social  cost  anC  may  be politically  difficult  to implement. A careful  balance
among  the  different  objectives  has to  be achieved.
The  conventional  tools  for  managing  aggregate  demand  are  fiscal  and
monetary  policy. The  fiscal  deficit  found  in  most  AL countries  is the  major
element  explaining  the  initial  excess  of demand  which  made the  program
necessary. A reduction  in this  deficit  is  usually  central  to an adjustment
program. If this  is achieved,  it  is possible  to reduce  the  rate  of growth  of
monetary  aggregates  and  bring  aggregate  demand  more in line  with aggregate
supply. Tight  monetary  policies  must  not be  overdone,  however,  since
excessively  high real  interest  rates  are  incompatible  with resumption  of
private  investment  and  growth.
Change  in  Relative  Prices
To  complement  aggregate  demand  reduction,  policies  aimed  at bringing
about  a change  in relative  prices  will  help  to restore  internal  balance  and
moderate  the  decline  in  expenditure.  By increasing  the  relative  prices  of
tradable  gcLds  to  non-t.adable  goods  through  a real  depreciation  of the
currency,  resources  are reallocated  or "switched'  from  the  non-tradable  goods
sector,  where  there  is  excess  supply,  to the  tradable  goods  sector,  where  they
can  produce  for  export  or substitute  imports. However,  prior  to the
devaluation,  it is important  to look  at the  impact  that  other  measures  of the
adjustment  package  will  have  on relative  prices. Only  after  this  is  done  can
the  amount  of depreciation  of the  nominal  exchange  rate  be determined.
Changes  in relative  prices  should  be as smooth  as possible. Overshooting  of
the  nominal  exchange  rate (as  well as  undershooting)  should  be avoided.
Increase  in  Output
To the  extent  that  output  can  be increased  by exporting  exports  and
increasing  production  of import  substitutes,  the  decline  in  expenditure  can  be
less,  or perhaps  avoided  altogether.  There  are  two  ways of doing  this:
First,  by using  more  efficiently  the  existing  stock  of factor  inputs  by
removing  distortions. Reforms  directed  at removing  these  distortions  have
been  a  main  concern  of the  Bank's  ALs.  Second,  by increasing  the  current
stocks  of factors  of production,  i.e.,  the  attainment  of a reasonable  rate  of
capital  accumulation.  A crucial  objective  of the  AL programs  is  to  ensure
that  an investment  level  is attained  which  is compatible  with  &.b acceptable
rate  of growth  over  the  medium-term.
Debt  Reduction
Efforts  to reduce  macroeconomic  imbalance  have  been  complicated  for
countries  with a large  external  debt. For  such  countries  closing  the  gap
between  aggregate  demand  and supply  has required  a large  fall  in real
expenditure  despite  efficiency  improvements.  Because  external  debt  in  most of
the  high  debt  countries  is in large  part  public  sector  debt,  servicing  this
debt  has  aggravated  existing  fiscal  weakness  adding  to  macroeconomic-7-
imbalance. For  those  high  debt  countries  which  have lost  access  to foreign
capital  markets,  there  is a  need  to  manage  their  budgets  under  tight  external
financing  constraints.  Excessive  reliance  on  domestic  borrowing  haQ in  many
of these  countries  caused  real  interest  rates  to rise  thereby .rowdxng  out
private  investment.  Where  governments  have relied  more  on  money  creation,
this  has resulted  in increased  inflatiorn  and,  in the  absence  of increased
private  financial  savings,  caused  foreign  exchange  reserves  to fall.
High levels  of external  debt  service  hav':  worsened  existing
rigidities  on the  expenditure  side (frequently  the  consequence  of a bloated
public  sector  wage  bV.l),  thereby  further  reducing  the  government's  room  for
maneuver  to reduce  the  fiscal  deficit. The  consequence  is that  public  sector
investment  has generally  born  the  brunt  of the  adjustment.  The  deterioration
of inrrastructure  and  public  sector  service  which  has  resulted,  has  had  an
adverse  impact  on output  further  complicating  the  adjustment  process. Viewed
from  another  perspective,  interest  payments  abroad  on external  debt  have
reduced  national  saving3,  which in  the  absence  of foreign  savings  have  been  a
binding  constraint  on investment  and  growth. For  countries  in this  situation
it  becomes  difficult  to restore  macroeconomic  balance  and  sustainable  economic
growth  while servicing  their  external  debt. Debt reduction  complements  the
adjustment  policies  described  in  the  previous  section.
Supply-Side  Structural  Reforms  and  Efficiency
The typical  adjustment  lending  country  faces  policy-induced
distortions  which limit  factor  productivity,  reduce  domestic  and  foreign
-ompetition,  and  prevent  goods  prices  from  reflecting  their  opportunity  cost.
Such  distortions  are  generally  the  result  of  weak institutions  and
inappropriate  policies. Supply  side  structural  reforms  aimed  at increasing
efficiency  and reestablishing  adeqcate  growth  are  focused  on strengthening
incentives  and  reducing  constraints  on factor  mobility. Empirical  work
carried  out  for  this  paper  suggests  that  such  reforms  are  unlikely  to  be as
successful  in countries  experiencing  large  macroeconomic  imbalances  and
financial  instability.
Success  in  eliminating  macroeconomic  imbalances  seems  to be an
especially  important  determinant  of tb-  3urvivability  of trade  liberalization.
If stabilization  efforts  are  unsuccesErul  in  reducing  inflation,  the
Government  may, out  of desperation,  use the  nominal  exchange  rate  as an anchor
for  domestic  prices 2. In such  cases  tle  real  exchange  rate  will appreciate
rapidly  if  domestic  prices  continue  to rise. If this  persists.  it  may
eventually  lead  to a  balance  of payments  crisis  which  ultimately  undermines
liberalization  of the  trade  regime. Where  governments  are  unsuccessful  in
stabilizing  the  domestic  economy,  the  real  exchange  rate  is  allowed  to
appreciatf  and inflation  continues  at relatively  high  rates,  the  real  interest
rate  is likely  to rise  to  excessively  high levels. This  may reduce  investment
2  In 21 stabilization  episodes  of AL countries  the real exchange  rate
appreciated  in  10 of them (see  Jim  Nash,  Trade  Policy  in  Adjustment  Lending,
1989,  background  paper  for  RAL2).-8-
and  prevent  the  restructuring  of the  economy  in response  to trade  policy
reform  which  is  necessary  if  the  liberalization  is to  be successful.  Finally,
if the  government  is not successful  in reducing  the  fiscal  deficit,
sustainability  and  deepening  of trade  reform  m&y  be jeopardized  since  there
will be pressure  to  overturn  tariff  liberalization  which  results  in  a loss  of
import  tax  revenue 3.
Sectoral  reforms  also  depend  heavily  on reduction  of  macroeconomic
imbalances.  The  more unsuccessful  the  government's  fiscal  deficit  reduction
effort,  the  greater  the  likelihood  that  public  investment  in infrastructure
which  complements  sectoral  restructuring  will be  cut. Macroeconomic
instability  is generally  associated  with  an appreciating  or  volatile  real
exchange  rate. When  the  real  exchange  rate  discriminates  against  tradables
or is  unstable,  sectoral  output,  profitability  and  reforms  are likely  to  be
adversely  affected. Excessively  high real  rates  of interest  which  are
generally  associated  with unsuccessful  stabilization  efforts  or programs  which
lack  credibility,  can  have serious  a;'verse  consequences  for  restructuring  of
sectoral  production  and  ultimately  on the  sustainability  of sectoral  reform.
Financial  sector  reform  has also  been  difficult  to carry  out  in
countries  experiencing  acute  macroeconomic  imbalance.  While  macroeconomic
instability  may  have  underscored  the  shortcomings  of the  financial  sector,
thereby  helping  to focus  the  government's  attention  on the  need for  financial
sector  reform,  the  high real  interest  rates  which  have  generally  followed
liberalization,  have  generated  financial  distress  among  borrowers  which in
turn  has  eroded  the  financial  viability  of financial  institutions  leading  to a
roll-back  of liberalization  efforts. Protracted  excessively  high real  rates
of interest  have  alsc.  complicated  macroeconomic  management  in the  short-term
by increasing  the interest  burden  of government's  domestic  borrowing  and in
the  medium-term  by requiring  an infusion  of government  resources  to shore  up
the financial  system. These  adverse  effects  of  high real  rates  of interest  on
macroeconomic  management  and  on the  financial  system  itself  has led  the  Bank
to  place  more emphasis  on rationalization  rather  than  on decontrol  of interest
rates.
Efforts  to liberalize  the  financial  system  before  the  government
succeeds  in stabilizing  the  domestic  economy  are  unlikely  to be successful  for
other  reasons. Where  the  government  has failed  to  bring  an underlying  fiscal
problem  under  control  for  a prolonged  period,  the  authorities  have generally
channeled  resources  from  the  financial  system  to  the  Government  through  direct
controls  which  have  undermined  the  viability  of the  financial  system. If the
fiscal  imbalance  has  not  been  eliminated  priz  to liberalization  of the
financial  system,  it  is likely  that  the  government  will continue  to rely  on
administrative  controls  to finance  the  public  sector  deficit  thereby
undermining  financial  sector  reform. If the  financial  system  is  dominated  by
government-owned  banks  and  the  government  controls  interest  rates  directly
through  its  shareholder  power  In the  commercial  banks,  there  will  be a further
undesirable  reduction  in the  monetary  policy  role  of the  Central  Bank  in favor
3  Jim  Nash,  Trade  Policy  in  Adjustment  Lending,  1989.-9-
of the  Ministry  of Finance. The  clear  lesson  of experience  is  that  far-
reaching  financial  sector  liberalization  can  survive  only  within  the  context
of  macroeconomic  stability.
Adiustment  Program  Design
The  following  taxonomy  classifies  adjustment  policies  according  to
their  principal  objective. This  classification  is  used  in the  next section  to
assess  the relative  importance  and  implementation  performance  of  macroeconomi.
adjustment  policies.
Adjustment  Program  Design
I.  Absorption  Reduction  Policies
Fiscal  Policy  (deficit  reduction  targets)
Monetary  Policy  (money  supply  targets)
II.  Expenditure-Switching  Policies
Exchange  Rate  Policies
Wage Policy






Financial  Sector  Reforms
Rationalization  of Government  Finance  & Administration
Public  Enterprise  Reforms
Social  Policy  Measures
III.  Implementation  of  Macroeconomic  Conditionality
In Bank-Supported  Adiustment  Programss 1980-89
This section  analyzes  the  Bank's  experience  with implementation  of
macroeconomic  conditionality  in  Bank-supported  structural  adjustment  programs.
It focuses  on the  design  and  implementation  of such  conditionality  in 184
adjustment  loans  to  62 countries  during  1980-894. Specifically,  it considers
the  macroeconomic  prerequisites  for  structural  reforms,  emphasizing  the
importance  of an appropriate  sequence  and  mix of  macroeconomic  and  supply-
side  policies  to achieve  internal  balance,  external  balance  and  growth-
oriented  adjustment.
4  For  a discussion  ct the  methodology  see  the  Appendix.- 10  -
Background
The  Bank  began -9s  lending  for  structural  adjustment  in 1980.
Although  at first  expected  to be short-lived,  adjustment  lending  increased  to
312  5f the  Bank's  total  lending  commitments  in  FY89.  The  scope  of adjustment
lending  aiso  widened  with the  introduction  of sectoral  adjustment  loans
(SECALs)  which  account  for  almost  all  of the  increase  in adjustment  lending
since  FY82.  Increasingly,  Structural  Adjustment  Loans  (SALs),  which  contain
comprehensive  macroeconomic  policy  conditionality,  gave  way to  more  narrowly
focused  SECALs;  increasingly  SECALs  themselves  have included  macroeconomic
conditionality.  In FY89,  the  Bank  undertook  35  adjustment-lending  operations,
of  which  27  were SECALs.
Since  1980,  62 countries  have  received  adjustment  loans  from  the
Bank.  Because  adjustm-nt  is a  process  which  in  most  countries  takes  a  number
of years,  and  because  subsequent  stages  of the  process  cannot  be initiated
until  the  objectives  of earlier  stages  have  been  substantially  achieved,  a
cointry  will  generally  need a series  of operations,  each supporting  specific
policy  actions.
Nature  of Bank  Conditionality  and  Implementation
A  typical  adjustment  lodn  disburses  in two  tranches. Some  conditions
are  required  for  effectiveness,  some  for  second  tranche  release,  and some  are
included  as special  covenants  which  are  not  binding  for  tranche  release.
Conditions  of disbursement  relate  to  policy  instruments  that  target  specific
objectives. For  example,  expenditure  and  production  switching  policies
encourage  both  exports  and  efficient  import  substitution  by raising  the
domestic  price  of tradables  relative  to the  price  of  non-tradables.  These
policies  taken  together  are  designed  to reduce  macroeconomic  imbalance,  to
improve  efficiency,  to strengthen  institutions  and  to  mobilize  additional
resources  for  investment.  While  conditionality  had  initially  been  based  on
the  premise  that  policies  which  reduce  macroeconomic  imbalances  and  price
distortions  will stimulate  savings,  contribute  to increased  investment,  and
accelerate  growth,  the  weak  growth  performance  of adjustment-lending  countries
has  heightened  awareness  that  other  measures  are  also  needed. These  include
institutional  reforms,  programs  aimed  at reducing  the  uncertainty  associated
with the  adjustment  which  private  investors  face,  specific  investments  aimed
at alleviating  real  constraints  in  the  economy,  &nd  where  necessary,  debt
reduction. Each  AL with its  broad  mix of  policies  is  placed  within  the
context  of a country's  own  reform  program,  which itself  is broader  and
generally  includes  some  elements  supported  by the  Fund.
There  is  a high  degree  of  variability  among  conditions  with regard  to
their  specificity.  The  Bank  has  moved  to using  more specific  conditions,
partly  guided  by experience.  More specific  conditions  have  higher
implementation  rates. The  average  number  of actions  has  almost  doubled  from
about  30 in  FY79-85  to 56 in FY89. About  one-third  of all  actions  are  legally
required  and  are  conditions  which  appear  in  loan  agreements.  The remainder- 11  -
are  listed  only in  the  President's  Reports. While  more than  a quarter  of all
policy  actions  are  precisely  specified  --  only  102  of the  actions  are  precise
and  included  in  the loan  agreement,  an average  of about  four  conditions  per
loan.
The  data  on implementation  which is  presented  in this  section
indicates  the  extent  to  which  a condition  was fulfilled  during  the  lifetime  of
a loan. Of the  184  loan  sample,  only  97 loans  have  been in  place  long  enough
to  make it  possible  to assess  the  experience  with implementation.  The  sources
of information  on implementation  were  mainly  Supervision  Reports,  Tranche
Release  Documents,  and  where  available,  Project  Completion  Reports  and  Program
Performance  Audit  Reports. These  sources  were supplemented  by additional
information  obtained  from  Bank  staff  familiar  with the  country's  adjustment
program.
While  the  process  of  coding  conditionality  is  straightforward,  the
process  of  coding  implementation  is  more complex. Progress  in implementing
each  item  of conditionality  during  the  period  of the  loan  was classified  as:
(a)  little  or no progress;  (b)  partial  progress;  (c)  substantial  progress
(substantial  steps  taken  to  move  progress  more than  half-way);
(d)  implementation  fulfilled;  and (e)  implementation  more than fulfilled.
Macroeconomic  Conditionality  in Program  Design
Because  of the  importance  of complementary  reforms  in  different
policy  areas,  recent  ALs  address  a  wide  variety  of  policy  areas  as they  did
when  SALs  were dominant. Macroeconomic  conditionality  defined  as demand
management  or absorption  reduction  and  switching  policies  has  been relatively
important  in adjustment  loans. Table  3.1  indicates  that  for  all  adjustment
loans  which  the  Bank  has  made since  1980,  fiscal  policy  conditions  were
present  in  51X  of all  loan  agreements.  This  has  increased  over time  for  the
early  intensive  adjustment  lending  countries  (EIAL) 5 from  47Z  in  FY79-85  to
532  in  FY89.  For  the  other  adjustment  lending  countries,  fiscal  policy
conditionality  has risen  from  332  to 582. Such  conditionality  has  been
especially  important  in the  Sub-Saharan  African  Countries  (692)  where
budgetary  problems  have been  acute. Fiscal  reforms  included  measures  to
reduce  the  deficit,  to enhance  the  efficiency  of raising  revenue,  and  to
increase  the  effectiveness  of government  expenditure.  Reductions  in  deficit
have  been  at the  core  of successful  AL operations.  Relatively  less  attention
has  been  given  to  monetary,  exchange  rate  and  wage policies,  although  the
importance  of these  too  has  been rising  over  time. Monetary  and  exchange  rate
policies  have  been  a central  focus  of IMF  programs. When the  Bank  and  Fund
have  concurrent  programs  with a country,  a frequent  occurrence,  these  policies
are  usually  left  to the  Fund.  In  those  cases  where  there  is a concurrent  Fund
program  and  exchange  rate  conditions  are  also  included  in the  Bank  loan,  it
may be  because  the  Fund  has different  exchange  rate  objectives  than  the  Bank.
5  Defined  as countries  that  have received  two  SALs or three  adjustment
operations  or  more starting  in 1985  or before.- 12 -
Implementation  of Macroeconomic  Condit  onality
More  than  half (66?)  of all  conditions  in adjustment  programs  are
judged  by Bank staff  to be implemented  fully  or  more than  fully  by the  time  of
final  tranche  release. This  rate  increases  to 84?  if conditions  on  which
progress  has  been substantial  are  also included. Loans  since  1985  have  higher
average  rates  of implementation  than  those  made  earlier. Table  3.2 shows  that
performance  in implementing  conditionality  varies  widely  across  types
of policies. For the  five  or six  critical  actions  in the  program  (coded  on
the  basis  of the  President's  Report),  the  implementation  rates  are  as good  on
average  as for  all  conditions  in the  legal  agreement. Implementation  of
macroeconomic  policy  conditionality  is  above  the  average  for  all  conditions
(e.g.,  74?  of fiscal  policy  is fully  implemented;  82? substantially
implemented;  752  of exchange  rate  policy  fully  implemented;  85Z  substantially
implemented).  This  may in part  be explained  by the  additional  leverage  in
support  of macroeconomic  policy  reform  from  concurrent  IMF  programs.
Implementation  rates  of supply-side  policy  categories  have,  as noted,
been strongly  affected  by  macroeconomic  performance. In some  instances
supply-side  policies  have  been incorporated  into  adjustment  lending
conditionality  during  early  stages  of the  country's  adjustment. In a  number
of cases  this  has  been  done  before  internal  or external  balance  has  been
reestablished.  In these  circumstances  implementation  has been  lower  than  the
average  for  all  conditions.
Implementation  rates  for  public  enterprise  reform  have  closely
paralleled  progress  in fiscal  policy  management. Such  reforms  have  been
implemented  more consistently  where  fiscal  deficit  reduction  has  been  an
important  objective  of  macroeconomic  policy. More  than  one-third  of recent  AL
contain  PE reform  measures. Such  reforms  have  made it possible  for  state
enterprises  to reduce  their  drain  on the  central  government  budget  by cutting
their  losses  through  restructuring  aimed  at increasing  efficiency  and lowering
costs  as  well ds  bringing  the  price  of goods  and  services  which  they  produce
more in line  with long-term  marginal  costs. Some  countries  have  made
significant  progress  in  divesting  public  enterprises. In others,  it  has been
difficult  to deal  with financially-ailing  entities:  closing  them  down  has
meant  increased  unemployment.  Without  prior  rehabilitation,  they  are  not
attractive  to  potential  buyers. In addition,  domestic  capital  markets  are
frequently  unable  to support  the  purchase  of such  enterprises. The  temptation
is therefore  for  governments  to continue  to run  these  entities. When the
circumstances  warrant  continued  public  ownership,  reform  measures  have aimed
at improving  efficiency  and  accordingly  profitability.  Reforming  management
and  allowing  competition  from  private  and  foreign  firms  helps  to raise
efficiency. This  was the  aim  of the  1989  Public  Enterprise  Reform  Loan (PERL)
to  Mexico,  for  example.
While  the  incentive  of tranche  release  motivated  policy  adjustment,
the  perceived  benefits  of adjustment  and  the  desire  to  have ongoing  AL also
motivated  reform. Indeed,  after  the  final  tranche  release  countries  usually
sustained  or increased  the  rate  of fulfillment.  Of the  conditions  that  were
not  at least  substantially  fulfilled,  about  one-third  are  substantially  or
completely  fulfilled  within  a year.  The  tendency  for  reform  inertia  toTable  3.1:  Importance  of  Macroeconmic  Conditionellty  in  Adjusteat  Loeding  Operations
Share of  Losae with  loan-agr.en_t  coaditions  or  actions io  various  policy  *reas  (percent)
Other  Share of  (2)
All  EIAL Countries  AL Ceuntri-e  loans  W/ actions
Contriee  SSA  HIs  SAL  SECAL  Hybrid  79-5 S  1*-98  89  79-86  8-9  *cti.n  to  various
(13U)  (34)  (64)  (73)  (110)  (10)  (5t)  (49)  (16)  (9)  (Cb)  pelicg  areas 113)
Absorellto  redction
oulicdes
Fiecal  policy  51  69  41  78  84  30  47  51  63  83  so  67
Menstry  policy
(mosyI Sppy  Targets"  1s  14  is  14  i6  10  7  16  13  11  24  42
II  Slitching  policies
Ezcbanvg  rtt  10  16  20  22  13  0  9  1t  20  11  22  46
sgs Pleicy  1i  2  S  26  0  20  4  6  7  11  29  22
III  Su.nlw-aide
erowth  oriented  selicies
Trad  pellet  _6  5a  67  64  55  90  60  09  33  60  U5  79
Sctoral  polici e
lIod.try  22  s0  16  26  20  10  24  20  27  22  20  44
Eergy  1i  12  14  21  11  so  1s  14  7  22  16  27
Agrleiltaral  46  62  so  50  37  90  44  3U  27  U  Ss  02
Fina_lcl  sector  U  20  31  40  26  20  16  5  27  44  40  51
3.tbimllgatleo  of  Govt
fls  _  a&  *daloletratio  51  U7  60  71  U  10  U1  6U  40  44  66  72
Pubile  EaterprIss  reforms  44  5  34  49  40  40  21  49  U  as  b6  O
Scial policy  r0frmn  11  18  9  11  11  10  I  20  0  22  11  24
Other  23  42  17  n  s2  10  7  27  20  a3  C1  49
Notes: 1. Nmbbre In  brckekt  (  )  are total  number  of  loans.
2.  All  countrie.  All  conditioens  celled  for  In  *11 loan  agreementa  or  other ctions  called  for In  all  President  Rports.
Source:  eed  on ranalysie  ot 138  SAL  and  SECALa  to  61  developing  countries.- 14 -
Table 3.2:  Implementation  of Adjustment  Lending Conditionality
In *11 loan  Agresements  1/  Critical  Actions  2/
Fully  At least  Fully  At least
Imple-  Substantially  Imple-  Substantially
mented  Implemented  mented  Implemented
I  Absorption reduction
policies
Fiscal policy  74  82  72  89
Monetary policy
[Money  Supply Targets]  67  83  61  89
II  Switching  policies
Exchange rate  75  8S  71  81
Wage policy  45  91  50  50
III  Supply-side
arowth  oriented policies
Trade policies  62  85  56  82
Sectoral  policies
Industry  72  92  53  65
Energy  69  80  72  80
Agricultural  62  81  49  74
Financial sector  73  89  79  92
Rationalization  of Gov't
finance  & administration  63  81  54  68
Public  Enterprise reforms  66  80  67  77
Social policy reforms  59  91  55  82
Total
Loan agreement conditions  3/  66  84  67  83
All conditions or actions  4/  57  77  60  79
Notes:  /  The  date  on  implementation  Indicate  the  extent  to  whlch  a  condition  or  action  was  fulfilled
at  final  trench,  release.  A  total  of  1,015  legal  conditlons  were  graded  on  implementation.
V  Critical  actiono  are  so  Identflied  because  Bank  staff  deslinino  the  operation  put  particular
emphasis  on  thm  an becauso thoy  were expected  to  ake a  slgnificant  contribution  to
adjustment  In  a  short  time.  A  total  of  194  actions  were  coded  as  critical,  of  which  808
appeared  as  conditions  in  the  loan  agreements.
/  The  implementation  rate  of  conditions  that  appear  In  the  loan  agr_ment.
/  Averago  Implementation  of  actions  which  apper  in  the  President's  Report  or  conditions  in
the  loan  agreemnt.  A  total  of  2,281  actions  were graded  In  Implementation.
Source:  osed  on  en  analysis  of  97  SALs  end  SECALs  In  82  developing  countries.  The  sourcoa  of
informtion  on  imploemntation  were  mainly  supervision  reports,  tranche  release  docuewnts,  and  where
available,  Project  Completion  Reports  and  Program  Portoremnce  Audit  Reports.- 15  _
continue  after  final  tranche  release  is  especially  true  for  some  key
macroeconomic  policies. Table  3.3  provides  information  regarding  the
sustainability  of reforms  once loan  disbursement  has  been  completed. It
indicates  that  reforms  initiated  in  conjunction  with Bank-supported  adjustment
prQgrams  generally  continue  after  loan  disbursement.
Sustained  improvement  in implemeatation  has  also  been  the  case  for
fiscal  policy. As borrowers  have  taken  steps  to  carry  out  administrative
reforms  aimed  at strengthening  public  sector  management  generally  and  have
gained  greater  control  over  public  enterprises,  expenditure  policy  planning,
and  the  budgetary  process,  fiscal  policy  objectives  have  been  easier  to
achieve. It  may  be unrealistic,  however,  to view  institutional  change  as
monotonic  or linear  since  the  likelihood  of sustained  reform  is
linked  to government  commitment  which itself  varies  with the  general  state  of
the  economy,  with  political  constraints,  and  with the  degree  to  which  leaders
agree  with the  substance  of reform  measures.
Table  3.4  indicates  that  loan  design  is  an important  determinant  of
implementation.  Actions  which  are  only  listed  in  President's  Reports  have
relatively  low  rates  of implementation  (only  49Z  are fully  implemented).
Actions  which  are  precisely  defined  have  higher  rates  of implementation  even
though  they  may  not  be legally  binding. Conditions  which  are  both  precisely
defined  and legally  binding  have  the  highest  rates  of implementation  (71%  are
fully  implemented).  This suggests  that  the  greater  the  specificity  of
conditionality  and  the  more legally  binding  the  more likely  it is that  it  will
be successfully  implemented.  This  is  particularly  true  of SALs,  where  the
average  rate  of implementation  for  actions  listed  only  in the  President's
Reports  is  472  while  the  rate  on precise  and  legally  binding  conditions  is
73Z. Greater  detail  may require  a larger  number  of conditions. General
conditions  that  summarize  the  spirit  of the  adjustment  effort  are  also
important.
IMF  Programs  and  Bank  Macroeconomic  Conditionality
The  Bank  consults  regularly  with the  International  Monetary  Fund.
The  Bank  has generally  refrained  from  adjustment  lending  if a cou.atry  with
macroeconomic  instability  does  not  have  a Fund  Program  --  a Standby  Agreement,
an Extended  Fund  Facility,  a SAF  or an ESAF.  But  the  Bank  has  made its  own
macroeconomic  assessments.  Over four-fifths  of SALs  and  over  three-fifths  of
SECALs  have Fund  programs  by the  time  of effectiveness.  In about  152  of these
cases  the  Fund  programs  are  subsequently  cancelled 6. The  macroeconomic
content  of the  Bank's  adjustment  lending  is  heavily  influenced  by the
commitments  which  the  borrowing  country  has  entered  into  with the
International  Monetary  Fund. Table  3.5  indicates  the  conditionality  content
of the  Bank's  adjustment  loans  where  there  is or is  not  a concurrent  IMF
program  and  the  rates  of implementation  for  adjustment  programs  with and
without  Fund  programs. In those  cases  where  the  IMF  does  not  have a  program,
Bank  conditionality  emphasizes  areas  of  macroeconomic  policy  (exchange  rate
and  monetary  supply  targets)  which  are  areas  of  primary  interest  to the  Fund.
6 Half  of  these  are  in  turn  revised  probably  with  less  strict  requirements.- 16  -
Table  3.3:  Implementation  of  Conditions  prior  to and  after  Tranche  Release
Percentage  of Conditions
During  the  Loan  Period  1/  Current  Situation  2/
Fully  At least  Fully  At least
Imple-  Substantially  Imple-  Substantially
mented  Implemented  mented  Implemented
I  Absorption  reduction
policies
Fiscal  policy  73  78  68  82
II  Switching  policies
Exchange  rate  78  78  60  90
III  Supply-side
growth  oriented  policies
Trade  policies  60  85  67  88
Sectoral  policies
Industry  57  86  73  88
Energy  71  79  92  92
Agricultural  65  85  69  86
Financial  sector  78  88  72  95
Rationalization  of Gov't
finance  & administration  56  77  67  90
Public  Enterprise  reforms  69  75  76  85
Total
Loan  agreement  conditions  3/  66  83  70  88
All  conditions  or actions  56  76  62  81
Notes:  n  /  At  final  trencho  releoa.
3V  At  least  12 months after  final  trench,  release.
!/  Based  on  conditons  which  apper  only  In  the  loan  agreements.  A  total  of  e9s  conditions  were
monitored.
Source:  Based  on  a  subset  of  97  SAL.  and  SECALS  to  82  countr10s.- 17 -
tabl .41  Spl-mentatien  of  condItIne  (Average  percent  et  final  tronch.  release)
All  conditions  or  actlonal  Lean Agree_ents2 Precise'
Fully  At  least  Fully  At  least  Fully  At  least
implemented  Substantially  S plemnted  Substantially  Implemented  Substantially
Imple  mnted  pl  lssted  mpl mnted
All  57  77  66  64  62  73
HICe  01  *2  72  s9  71  6t
SSA  55  75  60  s0  56  71
SAL.  5s  73  645  ea  s  74
SECAL  gO  sO  so  84  07  J2
EIAL countries
fY79-J5  S3  71  6O  sO  60  75
FYU  -9S  gO  02  Go  SO  62  79
Other  AL countries
fY79-S6  as  O7  as  74  43  Is
fYP6-Sn  70  94  '6  93  63  93
Actions  only  In
Proc  e  and  L  og14  Proold  nt  @ Roports'
Fully  At  loast  Fully  At  loest
implemented  Substantially  Implemented  Substantially
Iple*ented  m  pl  mented
All  71  so  49  72
mCie  7"  9'3  s  74
SSA  04  62  sO  70
SALs  73  67  47  69
SECALs  70  6O  Sp  70
EIAL  countries
FY79-O6  71  e6  47  66
FYJ4-JJ  69  es  64  76
Other  AL  countries
PY79-65  40  92  3O  59
fYJO-68  93  97  31  9S
Source; Based  on  an  analysis  of  97 loans  to  32  developing  countries.
All  conditions  called  for In  the loan  agrement  or  other  actions  called  for  In  the
President's  Report,  except  prior  actions,  arm  not  lneluded  because  thoy  aro  said  to  be
fulfilled  Opriors  to  negotiation.
V,  All  conditions  In  th, loan  agreement.
3/  Preelso  conditions  or  actions  are  specific  and  usually  quantitiable.
O  Precie  and legal  conditions  are  those  which  appear  In  the  Loan  Agreement  and  are
specific  In  nature.
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Interestingly, the data indicates that the share of loans with fiscal
policyconditionality is greater  where there is a concurrent Fund program.
This is in part a reflection of the nature of the lending instrument.  Most
SALs  have Fund programs in place.  The Fund has traditionally relied on the
Bank to carry out a review of public sector investment programs where it  has
aprogram.  It is likely that this complementarity  between the Fund and the
Bank results in greater involvement  of the Bank in issues of public finance
where there is a Fund program.
Supply side policy conditionality  is also significantly affected by
the presence of a Fund program.  Rationalization of Governmert Finance and
Administration and Public Enterprise Reforms receive more emphasis in Bank
adjustment loans  which are concurrent  with Fund programs than those which are
not.  These areas receive greater emphasis because of the greater attention to
fiscal  policy in such loans.  Financial sector polcies  are given less
emphasis where there are Fund programs primarily because banking system
policies and broader financial sector policies are a natural extension of the
Fund's primary area of focus.  On average, though, there are insignificant
differences in rates of implementation  of Bank program conditionality  with and
without Fund programs.
Inflation and Implementation  of Macroeconomic Conditionality
Sometimes the  macroeconomic environment  deteriorates during the
course of the program.  For example, the  Argentine Export Development AL of
FY87  was undertaken although inflation  exceeded 1002 annually during the first
four quarters following effectiveness.  In total, seven SECALs and one SAL
were undertaken despite an inflation rate exceeding 1002 annually during the
first four quarters after effectiveness.  Implementation of adjustment policy
is influenced to a great extent by the macroeconomic environment.  The results
of the empirical  work prese  :ed  in this section confirm that a supportive
macroeconomic environment i  one of the most important  determinants of
implementation  in adjustment programs.  Based on the average share of
conditions implemented  per loan, Table 3.6 indicates that implementation  was
significantly lower the more severe  the internal  macroeconomic imbalance
(i.e.,  the higher the rate of inflation).  While the presence of a concurrent
Fund program is on average corre,lated  with lower rates of inflation, the
result is  not statistically significant  at tne 5% level.  Table 3.7 indicates
the implementation rates for different types of adjustment policies according
to  whether the adjusting country  has low,  moderate or high rates of inflation.
It takes a longer view of the inflationary  environment and the uncertainty
associated  with greater price instability.  It indicates that macroeconomic
policies are more apt  to be implemented  where there is low or  moderate
inflation.  Policies aimed at changing real relative prices (switching
policies) tend to be more difficult to implement, the higher the rate of
inflation.  Exchange rate policies (real  exchange rate targets)  were the most
adversely affected by high rates of inflation.  For this type of
conditionality implementation rates fell from 80% implemented  with low
inflation to 36Z with high inflation.  It is likely that this reflects the
growing concern of policy  makers with the inflationary  effects of a nominal
devaluationa  and increasing reluctance to use the nominal exchange rate as an
instrument  of economic policy as inflation rises.  Overvalued or unpredictable- 20 -
real exchange rates are common in countries  with high inflation, such as
Brazil and Yugoslavia.  With extremely  high rates of inflation governments are
more apt to use the exchange rate as a nominal anchor thereby sacrificing
adjustment to stabilization objectives.  Most supply side policies are also
adversely affected by inflation.  Trade, agricultural pricing and social
policy reforms appear to be the most difficult to implement in a high
inflation environment.
Economic Growth
Table 3.8 relates implementation  of conditionality to economic
growth.  It indicates that where countries  have been successful in
reestablishing  adequate, sustainable rates of economic growth, implementation
rates are substantially improved across all policy categories.  This suggests
a causal relationship between growth and the degree of success a government is
likely to have in implementing  adjustment  policies.  An equally plausible case
can be made that the  more successful  a government is in implementing
adjustment policies, the better its growth performance will be other things
being equal.  Causality probably runs in both directions.
IV.  FY89 Adjustment Lending
Background
During FY89 adjustment lending  continued to grow in importance in the
Bank's total lending.  The Board approved 34 adjustment operations for a total
of $6.4  million, up from 29 for $5.0  million in FY88 (Table  4.1).  Adjustment
lending as a share of total commitments rose from 26Z in FY88 to 30? in FY89.
Within total adjustment lending, SECALs continued to grow in importance
(20  SECALs  were approved in FY89, up from 18 in FY88).  The relative
importance of adjustment lending  was greatest in Latin America (482), followed
by Africa (24Z),  Asia (14Z)  and EMENA (14Z) (Table  4.2).
The main foci  of FY89 SECALs  were industry and trade (nine),
financial sector (seven),  ai.ni  agriculture (three).  SALs continued to focus on
broader macroeconomic adjustment  policies.  In Africa six SALs  were committed
in FY89; in LAC, four.  No slower  disbursing, sector loans  which finance a
time slice of a country's sectoral  investment program (which  RAL I had noted
were a form of lending  particularly  well suited for dealing  with medium-term
institutional  reforms)  were approved  by the Board in FY89.
It was initially envisaged that the Bank's adjustment lending to a
country  would continue for several  years through a series of operations (up to
five).  The number of countries  with multiple operations increased further in
FY89 (from  40 in FY88 to 47).  Turkey had the largest  number of multiple
adjustment loans (10).  The Africa Region had the largest concentration  of
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I.  Absorption  Reduction Policies (2)
Fiscal Policy  61.0  95.2  79.1  00.4  o5.0  60.0
II.  Sietching  Polici  se
Eachonge Ret.  100.0  100.0  64.6  92.3  40.0  00.0
Xll.  Supplp-Sid., Orowth-Orie.t*e  Policies
Trdeu Policieo  84.7  6U.2  62.3  ".9  as.  a  .9
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EnrOV  70.0  90.0  71.4  71.4  100.0  100.0
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All  Conditiona  of  Action.  59.4  aV.9  57.4  76.6  49.2  71.6
tk&2:  (1)  The people  of  adjustment  *rogram is di.ided into  tiero.  groups --  tloo  eaperiencing  lowI  moderate, or high roaes of  inflsaion during
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Som  tea-  --  .a  "bset  of  57  *eJdotee"&  aneTable  4.1s:  Fn9  ADJUSThENT  OPERATIONS  STATUS REPORT/
(as of June  30, 1989)
IBRD  IDA  Total
Board  Status  Country  Name  Type  Board  Date  Ntiber  (USSn)  (US51)  (US$m)
Approved  Argentina  Trade  Policy  11 Loan  SAD  10127188  1  300.0  .0  300.0
8angladesh  Energy  Sector  SAD  0411/I89  1  .0  175.0  175.0
Industrial  Sector  Cr.  Suppl.  SAD  03113189  0  .0  2.5  2.5
Benin,  People's  Rep.  SAL I  SAL  05123189  1  .0  45.0  45.0
Bolivia  Finan.  Sector  SAD  03113109  0  .0  11.3  11.3
Burundi  Agric.  Sys.  SAD  05125189  1  .0  33.1  33.1
Caseroon  SAL I  SAL  06114189  1  150.0  .0  150.0
Chad  Financlel  Rehab.  Cr  SAD  07127188  1  .0  16.2  16.2
Transport  Sector  AdJ  SAD  04125189  1  .0  60.0  60.0
Costa  Rica  SAL 11  SAL  12113/88  1  100.0  .0  100.0
Gambia  SAL 11  SAL  06108189  1  .0  23.0  23.0
Ghana  FtH.  Sector  Adj  SAD  03113189  0  .0  6.6  6.6
SAC 11  SAL  04116189  1  .0  120.0  120.0
Cuinea  Bleaau  SAC 11  SAL  051i8I89  1  .0  23.4  23.4
Hondurae  SAL I  SAL  09/l5S/8  1  50.0  .0  50.0
Indoneale  Private  Sector  Devt.  Loan  SAL  06106189  1  350.0  .0  350.0
Kenya  Finamcial  Sec.  Operations  SAD  06127189  1  .0  120.0  120.0
Ind.  Sec.  Ad).  SAD  03113/89  0  .0  53.7  53.t
l-o P.  0. R.  Struct.  AdJ. Credit  SAL  06114189  1  .0  40.0  40.0
Hada6ascar  Public.  Sec.  AdJ.  SAD  03113189  0  .0  1.4  2.4
Halawi  Ind.  Trade  AdJ.  SAD  03113189  0  .0  5.2  5.2  1
mali  Human  Resource  SECAL  SAD  06127189  1  .0  26.0  26.0
Mexico  Fin.  Sec.  Ad).  SAD  06113/89  1  500.0  .0  500.0
Ind.  Restructuring  SAD  04/27189  1  250.0  .0  250.0
Ind.  Sector  Policy  SAD  06113189  I  500.0  .0  500.0  I
Pub.  Enterp.  Ref. I  SAD  06113189  I  500.0  .0  500.0
Morocco  SAL I  SAL  12101188  1  200.0  .0  200.0
Mozambique  Rehab.  III  SAL  05118/89  1  .0  90.0  90.0
Nepal  Structural  Adj. 11  SAL  06127189  1  0.0  60.0  60.0
Nigeria  Trade  & Inveat.  Policy  Loan  SAD  12122/88  I  SOO.0  .0  500.0
Pakistan  Agric.  Sector  Loan  SAD  00102188  1  200.0  .0  200.0
Energy  Sector  Loan It  SAD  0629189  1  250.0  .0  250.0
Financial  Sector  Adj.  SAD  03128189  1  250.0  .0  150.0
Philippines  Financial  Sector  Loan  SAD  05104189  1  300.0  .0  300.0
Seneg  a  SAL IlI  SAL  03113189  0  .0  5.5  5.5
Somalia  SALIASAP  11  SAD  06101189  1  .0  10.0  70.0
Tantanit  Ind.  Trade  AdJ.  SAD  03)13189  0  .0  12.5  12.5
Ind.  & Trade  Adjust.  Cr.  SAD  12/31188  1  .0  IS.0  135.0
Togo  SAL  III  SAL  03113189  0  .0  .1  .1
Tunisia  ASAL 11  SAD  06101189  1  84.0  .0  84.0
Uganda  IDA  Reflow  Supplemental  SAL  03113189  0  .0  1.7  1.7
ERCI  Supplemental  SAL  04120189  0  .0  25.0  25.0
Uruguay  SAL 11  SAL  06108189  1  140.0  .0  140.0
Venezuela  SAL  SAL  06115189  1  402.0  .0  402.0
Trade  Policy  Loan  SAD  06/15189  1  353.0  .0  353.0
Total  Approved  34  5279.0  1162.2  6441.2
Total  34  5279.0  1162.2  6441.2
Type:  SAI.  - Structural  Adjustment  or  Program  Loan  Revised  612190
SAD - Sector  Adjustment  Loan
Supplemental  and  8-Lans  are shown  as 0 In  the  number  column.- 25  -
Takla  4.2:  PY89 ADJUSTYINT  LENDING
No.  of  No.  of  S Total
SALs  Secal  Secal.  Total  Lendin8
LAC  4  692.0  6  2414.3  3106.3  48.2
AFRICA  6  483.7  8  1039.7  1523.4  23.8
ASIA  3  450.0  2  477.5  927.5  14.3
EMENA  1  200.0  4  684.0  884.0  13.7
TOTAL  14  1825.7  20  4615.5  6441.2  100.0
Table  4.3:  NUMBER  OF COUNTRIES  WITH MULTIPLE  ADJUSTMENT  OPERATIONS
Number  of  Countries  Number  of  Countries
with two  or more  vith three  or  more
Adjustment  Loans  Loans
AFRICA  22  14
ASTA  6  4
LAC  13  10
EEMNA  6  4
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The  Macroeconomic  Underpinnings  of  FY89  Adjustment  Lending
To assess  the  macroeconomic  underpinnings  of FY89  adjustment  lending,
economists  in the  Macroeconomic  Adjustment  and  Growth  Division  reviewed  23
adjustment  loans  to 18 countries 7. The  sample  includes  six  SALs  and  17 SECALs
which  are included  in the  list  of countries  which the  Division  covers  as  part
of its  on-going  review  work.  Background  case  studies  were prepared  for  each
of these  loans  and  are  available  on request. They  are  based  on reviews  of
Initiating  Memoranda,  President's  Reports  and  Loan  Agreements,  the  agendas  and
minutes  of Operations  Committee  meetings,  and  discussions  with regional  staff.
The  summary  of findings  which  follows  focuses  on three  areas:  (a)  the  initial
macroeconomic  conditions  at the  time  the  loan  was committed;  (b)  fulfillment
of preconditions  of adjustment  lending;  and (c)  the  design  of the  Bank's
macroeconomic  conditionaiity.
Initial  Conditions
To  what extens  were  the  countries  in  the sample  experiencing
significant  macroeconomic  difficulties  at  the  time  the  loan  was committed?
Reviewers  found  that  almost  all  of the  countries  were experiencing  some  form
of  macroeconomic  imbalance  'n  FY89.  These  difficulties  ranged  from
hyperinflation,  acute  external  imbalance  and  accelerated  decline  of output  in
Argentina  to  mild stagflation  in  Uruguay. In some  countries  the  economy  had
been stabilized,  but  thus  far  it  had  not  been  possible  to reestablish  growth
(Bolivia).  In some  of the  sample  countries,  macroeconomic  imbalances  were
becoming  more severe  (Brazil,  Pakistan  and  Cameroon). In others,  the
situation  was improving  (Ghana,  Mexico,  Uruguay  and  Philippines).  In all  of
these  countries,  with the  possible  exception  of Indonesia,  a plausible  case
could  be made that  there  is a  need for  Bank  support  in  the form  of adjustment
lending  to  either  reverse  deterioration  of the  macroeconomic  environment  or to
sustain  the  adjustment  effort  and  help  ensure  against  policy  backsliding.
Of the  18 countries  in  the  sample,  only  Indonesia  appears  to
have  overcome  its  macroeconomic  imbalances.  The  country  had  already
undertaken  a  major  adjustment  effort  and  now  appears  to  have recovered  from
the  oil  price  shock  of 1986. Growth  of  non-oil  output  has  been restored  to
over  52 annually,  inflation  is  under  102,  and  the  deficit  in  the  current
account  of the  balance  of  payments  has  been  reduced  to  under  32  of GDP.  The
Region's  adjustment  lending  strategy  for  Indonesia  is to  use  adjustment
lending  as an ex  post reward  for  actions  already  taken,  rather  than  as an
inducement  for  undertaking  new stabilization  or other  macroeconomic  policy
reforms. While  there  may  be special  circumstances  which  justify  continuation
of  adjustment  lending  for  the  next  several  years  as envisaged  in the  Region's
7  Even countries  with reasonably  consistent  programs  are not without
problems. Some  high debt  countries  such  as Bolivia  are  unable  to reestablish
adequate  rates  of economic  growth  despite  the  existence  of a relatively  stable
macroeconomic  environment;  in  this  regard,  even  for  these  countries,  adjustment
programs  were not  fully  consistent.- 27 -
Five-Year  Lending  Program,  the  Indonesia  case  does raise  an important
question: At  what point  following  restoration  of  macroeconomic  balance  is it
appropriate  to discontinue  adjustment  lending?
Preconditions  for  Adjustment  Lending
In analyzing  the  macroeconomic  underpinnings  of each  adjustment
loan  in  the  sample,  the  assessments  focused  first  on  whether  the
preconditions  for  adjustment  lending  had  been  met.  There  are  three  such
preconditions:  (a)  that  the  government  "own'  the  program;  (b)  that  a
consistent  macroeconomic  adjustment  program  be in  place  at the  time  of Board
presentation  and  that  there  be a recorded  agreement  between  the  Bank  and  the
borrower  on the  key elements  of a  medium-term  adjustment  program,  including
short-term  stabilization  measures;  and (c)  that  the  program  be realistic  and
adequately  financed.
Most  countries  were found  to  have  met  the first  precondition  of
adjustment  lending. This  was the  case  for  five  of the six  SALs  reviewed  and
for  13  of the  17 SECALs. However,  reviewers  encountered  practical
difficulties  in  making  this  determination.  First  it is  difficult  in  most
cases  to find  direct  evidence  which  provides  an unambiguous  indication  that
the  government  is  on the  record  publicly  as "owning"  the  program. Second,  as
a  consequence  of this,  reviewers  were forced  to rely  heavily  on  what they
could  glean  from  documents  prepared  to justify  the loan. These  documents  are
part  analytical  and  part  advocacy  in  nature;  the  presentation  is such  that  it
is frequently  difficult  to distinguish  the  two. Judgments  made  by reviewers
may reflect  the  positive  interpretation  of events  which is  generally  contained
in these  documents. The  results  shown  above  may,  therefore,  overstate  the
degree  of Government  ownership  of the  adjustment  program.
The second  precondition  has two  parts:  (a)  that  a consistent
adjustment  program  exists  at the  time  of  Board  presentation;  and (b)  that
there  be a recorded  agreement  between  the  Bank  and the  Borrower  on  key
elements  of the  short-term  and  medium-term  program. The  reviews  indicate  that
about  half  of these  countries  met  the  first  part  of this  precondition.  In  a
few  cases  it  was reasonably  clear  that  a  country  had  a consistent  adjustment
program  in  place  at the  time  of Board  presentation  (Bolivia,  Uruguay,
Philippines) 8. It  was equally  clear  that  such  a program  did  not exist  in
others  (Argentina,  Brazil,  Cameroon,  Pakistan). For  most countries  in  the
sample,  however,  the  judgment  was  more difficult.
For some  countries,  the  existence  of a Fund  program  provided
some  indication  that  a consistent  stabilization  program  exists. In  Venezuela,
for  example,  the  government  has  a strong  commitment  to adjustment  and  has  in
place  a reasonably  consistent  short-term  stabilization  and  medium-term
8  Even countries  with reasonably  consistent  programs  are not without
problems. Some  high  debt countries  such  as Bolivia  are  unable  to reestablish
adequate  rates  of economic  growth  despite  the  existence  of a relatively  stable
macroeconomic  environment;  in  this  regard,  even  for  these  countries,  adjustment
programs  were  not fully  consistent.- 28 -
adjustment  program. The  authorities  have  worked  closely  with the  Fund  and  the
Bank;  an IMF Standby  Agreement  is  currently  being  replaced  by an EFF.
Negotiations  with the  commercial  banks  have  not  yet  been  completed,  however,
and  other  elements  of the  external  financing  program  are in  doubt. Because  of
apparent  or real  political  constraints,  the  government  has  had  to act less
forcefully  in some  areas  of reform  (liberalization  of interest  rates)  than  it
had  hoped  initially. Even  where  an IMF  program  did  exist  in  FY89,  this  did
not  ensure  that  a consistent  macroeconomic  program  was in place  (Brazil).
To judge  whether  a consistent  macroeconomic  program  existed,
reviewers  asked  a number  of questions  to  make their  determination.  These
questions  and  the  results  are  shown  in  Table  4.4. Reviewers  found  that  for
all  SALs  a Fund  program  was in  place  at the  time  of Board  presentation.  For
SECALs,  Fund  programs  existed  in only  two-  thirds  of the  FY89  AL countries.
The  practice  which  currently  exists  in  Operations  is  for  the  Bank  to reach  its
own independent  judgment  of the  consistency  of the  macroeconomic  program  which
is  being  supported  by the  Fund.  Reviewers  found  that in  most cases,  this
appeared  to  have  been  done (about  80?).
Reviewers  then  turned  to the  quality  of the  analytical  work done
by staff  to assess  the  consistency  of the  macroeconomic  framework. For  all  of
the  Bank's  borrowers,  a Revised  Minimum  Standard  Model (RMSM)  had  been
prepared. The  standard  RMSM,  however,  does  not  ensure  consistency  between  the
budget,  the  public  enterprises,  the  monetary  sector,  the  external  accounts,
the  private  sector  and  the  national  accounts. It is  not  possible  to check  the
macroeconomic  consiotency  which  underpins  an adjustment  loan  with the  RMSM.
To ensure  the  consistency  of short-term  and  medium-term  macroeconomic  policies
a more sophisticated  model  is required  ("RMSM-X"  or "XX T ).  Reviewers
determined  whether  a flow  of funds  consistency  model (or  other  model  which
incorporates  behavioral  structure)  had  been  used  by the  Bank  to evaluate  the
macroeconomic  framework. The  results  indicate  that  in about  60?  of the  AL
sample  countries  this  had  not  been  done.
For  the  second  part  of the  precondition  (that  there  be a
recorded  agreement  between  the  Bank  and  the  borrower  regarding  the  adjustment
program)  reviewers  looked  at  Letters  of Development  Policy  which  had been
prepared  for  each  adjustment  operation  (Table  4.5). While  the  Letter  of
Development  Policy  has  no legal  standing,  it is  the  principal  vehicle  for
recording  understandings  which  are  reached  between  the  Bank  and  the  borrower.
The  findings  were that  in  mar.y  cases  (73Z)  the  Letter  of  Development  Policy
does  contain  a general  understanding  on overall  macroeconomic  policy.
However,  in  only  about  one-third  of the  cases  do these  letters  record
understandings  on short-term  stabilization  policies.
Finally,  reviewers  evaluated  the  extent  to  which  the  third
precondition  had been  met  by assessing  the  adequacy  of external  financing  and
the realism  of the  analysis. In  about  half of the  cases  the  analysis  was
judged  to  be unrealistic.  While  this  judgment  might  be questioned  as being
excessively  demanding  of the  country  projections,  it is  more favorable  than
the  results  of a similar  assessment  of realism  recently  carried  out  by central
staff  in Finance  which  concluded  that  only  25?  of the  country  projections  are
realistic.- 29  -
Table  4.4:  AOIACY  Of  MACROICONIC  FRAMEWOK IN  FY*9 AL COIMTIES
S1AL.  SECAL.  Total
Was there  a  Fund  Proorm In  plicet  Yen  t00  ,.7  76.2
me  0  $8.8  22.8
Did  the  lank  evaluate  thil  Proram?  Y"  68.8  n.6  73.6
me  16.7  22.2  21.4
Did  the  Book  use  a  cosnistency  model to  Yes  88.8  41.2  38.1
check  the  saero  coamic frameeork?  me  ".7  f,.3  60.9
Was  the analysis  done  by  the  Bank  Yee  $0.0  l@.@  U.5
rsslistlc?  me  30.0  41.2  48.5- 30  -
Table  4.t fYS ABJJSTMOiT  LOAKS: ACtIMYff  ON  MACROECONOMIC  POLICY
CONTAD  DiN  LETTES OF  DEVELAPMS4T  POLICY
GCneral  Agreement  on Macroseonomic  Agreoont  on Short-Tore
Country  Loa Now  Conslstency  of  th  Progroa !/  StabiIlzation  Policy  q
Argentlno  Trde Peolicy  N  N
hga I  adi  Eertgy  Seteor  4  N
S1Irt  SAL t  y  y
Burundi  Agricultural  N  N
Comre.r  SAL I  Y  Y
Chad  Transport  See  N  N
Financial  Rehab  Y  N
Coe"t  RIcO  SAL It  Y  Y
Gamble  SAL  11  Y  N
Ghana  SAC  It  v  Y
Gulaoi  elsi  u  SAL ItI  Y  Y
Guinea  SAL  Y  Y
lmebduras  SAL  I  Y  Y
Indonesia  Private  Sector  Developent  Y  N
Konya  PSNIL  Y  N
Lao P.D.1.  SAL  I  Y  y
Mexico  Ind.  Pol.  Y  N
Pt  N  N
PINSL  Y  N
Ind.  Reotructuring  y  N
Morocco  SAL  I  Y  N
Mo  'mbique  Rehab.  Cr.  III  Y
"epal  SAC  Kt  y  y
Nigerla  Trode/Inv.  Pol  Y  Y
Pokilton  Energy  Sec  N  N
Agric.  Sec  N  N
FtNIL  Y  N
Philpplnes  FPNSL  N
Soeoli  Agricultural  Y  N
Tansania  Ind.  Trode  Adjustmnt  Y  N
Tunisia  Agricultural  Sector  It  N  N
Uruguay  SAL  tI  Y  Y
VeOH  uola  Trode  y  N
SAL  I  Y  Y
j/  ThIe eelso.  ldleates  whether thore  Is  (Y)  or  Is  net  (N) a genral  agreement on meroeeonomic
polley.  The asr seemt  or  maroeoneo  ic  policy  cowr  te  following  areas: esehogoe  rate,  toa,
w*o  debt  m  sent,  budget  deficit,  public  currest  ar  capitol  expeniturco,  subeldloe  and
me_y  "uply  PO  lles.
ki  This  colum  indicates  wbether  them  Is  (Y)  so  I  mt  (N)  a  specific  sgrsm  a  Short-term
stobilzartioe  policies.
Sleurce:  President's  Report,  Letters  of Developomet  Pol icy- 31 -
Macroeconomic  Policy  in Program  Design
The  analysis  next turned  to  the  macroeconomic  content  of Bank-
supported  adjustment  programs  and  to  an assessment  of the  extent  to  which  key
macroeconomic  policy  elements  of the  program  were incorporated  into  the
conditionality  of the  adjustment  loan. Two-thirds  of the  loans  were found  not
to  have introduced  (or  to have  been  introduced  only  partially)  the  key
elements  of the  macroeconomic  policy  framework.
Table  4.6  lists  for  all  of the  adjustment  loans  committed  in
FY89  all  of the  legally  binding  macroeconomic  conditionality.  Eleven  loans,
including  one  SAL  had  no such  conditionality.  Only five  loans  had  three  or
more legally  binding  conditions.  One  loan,  the  Cameroon  SAL,  had  a total  of
275  conditions  of  which  only  three  were legally  binding  macroeconomic
conditions. These  three  conditions  were general  ("adopt  the  public  investment
program  in FY89  and  FY90'  and "provide  adequate  funding  for  the  execution  of
the  program").
The  Bank frequently  has included  macroeconomic  policies  in
President's  Reports  as a "desired  action'  (i.e.,  not legally  binding).
Reviewers  focused  on program  content  to identify  which  macroeconomic  policies
have  most frequently  been  part  of  overall  program  design. As discussed  in
Section  II  and  applied  in Section  III,  policies  were classified  as expenditure
reduction,  switching  and,  supply-side  policies.
Fiscal  deficits  are  frequently  the  driving  force  behind
inflation  and  balance  of payments  deficits. They  contribute  to  high real
rates  of interest,  lower  levels  of investment  and  declining  growth. To  what
extent  did  the  Bank's  FY89  adjustment  loans  contain  fiscal  deficit  reduction
as a condition  for  second  tranche  release? It  was found  that  about  two-
thirds  of the  operations  reviewed  had such  conditionality;  in  most cases,  this
was  not legally  binding.
Switching  policies  were given  less  importance  in the  loans
reviewed. For  602  of  all SECALs  there  was  no  mention  of exchange  rate  policy.
While  a large  number  of SALs  included  exchange  rate  policy  in the  program,
there  were  no instances  where it  was a clearly  specified  legally  binding
condition.
The  most important  focus  of the  Bank's  FY89  adjustment  lending
continues  to be supply-side  policies  aimed  at increasing  output  (Table  4.7).
Legally  binding  conditions  are  much  more important  in areas  related  to supply-
side  policies. About  half of the  FY89  loans  reviewed  contained  legally
binding  conditionality  related  to  public  sector  and  fina:..ial  sector  reform.
Such  conditionality  was also  found  to be important  in  policy  areas  dealing
with trade  and  pricing  policy  reforms;  this  was included  in about  one-third  of
the  loans.
Many of the  conditions  included  in  an adjustment  loan  are
complementary;  some  may be  potentially  conflicting.  For  example,
liberalization  of the  trade  regime  which  includes  tariff  reduction  may
conflict  with budget  and  current  account  deficit  reduction. Reviewers- 32  -
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Table  4.7s  SUPPLY-SIDE  POLICIES  IN FY89  ADJUSTMENT  LOANS
SALS (1)  SECALs  (2)  Total  (X)
Public  Soctor  Reform
Legally  binding  66.7  35.3  43.5
Desired  33.3  29.4  30.4
None  0.0  35.3  26.1
Trade  Policy  Reform
Legally  binding  66.7  23.5  34.8
Desired  16.7  35.3  30.4
None  16.7  41.2  34.8
Financial  Sector  Reform
Legally  binding  33.3  52.9  47.8
Desired  50.0  11.8  21.7
None  16.7  35.3  30.5
Pricing  Policy  Reform
Legally  binding  66.7  17.6  30.4
Desired  0.0  52.9  39.1
None  33.3  29.'  30.4-34  -
assessed  the  degree  to  which  there  were potentially  conflicting  conditions
contained  in an operation. Numerous  examples  of such  conflicts  could  be
identified.  Conflicts  among  financial  reform  and  budget  deficit  reduction
were present  in Brazil  and  Nigeria. Trade  liberalization  conflicted  with
budget  deficit  reduction  in  Argentina  and  Cameroon. Finally,  exchange  rate
policy  and  the  decision  to  maintain  ceilings  on interest  rates  in  Venezuela
seem  to be inconsistent.  Overall,  about  one  quarter  of FY89  loans  reviewed
were found  to contain  such  conflicts.
Related  to potential  conflicts  in the  program  is  the issue  of
appropriate  sequencing.  Sectoral  reforms  may  not  be effective  unless  they  are
preceded  by adequate  progress  in stabilization.  In  addition,  adjustment  costs
can  be minimized  if  the  program  is  designed  in  a  way that  avoids  giving
contradictory  signals  to producers  by overshooting  of exchange  rate  or price
adjustments,  if this  is  achieved,  the  movement  to  the  new  equilibrium  will  be
as smooth  as  possible.
Reviewers  found  that  about  one-third  of the  FY89 SECALs  had  been
made  before  there  was adequate  progress  in stabilizing  the  economy. In about
half  of all  adjustment  loans  reviewed  they  had questions  about  the sequencing
of the  measures  proposed  which  were  not  addressed  in the  loan  documents.
Table  4.8  indicates  those  countries  which  reviewers  considered
to  be examples  of  best  practice  in  ensuring  an adequate  macroeconomic  policy
framework  and in  resolving  key issues  in the  use  of adjustment  loans.
Conclusions  and  Issues  Identified  in  the  Case  Studies
A substantial  amount  of case  study  material  was generated  as an
input  for  the  paper. The  following  is a summary  of issues  and  conclusions
identified  in the  case  studies:
(a)  Analytical  Framework. Adjustment  lending  should  fit  into  a
medium-term  macroeconomic  framework  which  ensures  consistent
demand  management,  switching,  supply-oriented  growth  policies,
and  adequate  external  financing  packages. This  framework  should
at a  minimum  be based  on a quantitative  analytical  structure
which  links  stock  and  flow  variables  for  the  non-financial
public  sector,  the  monetary  sector,  the  balance  of payments,  the
national  accounts  and  the  private  sector. The  emphasis  should
be on financing  the  government  budget  and  the  external  sector.
Resources,  time  and  data  permitting,  this  quantitative  framework
would  be extended  to include  a  behavioral  structure  which  would
permit  disaggregated  simulation  of the  effects  of adjustment
policies. Analysis  carried  out  by the  IMF  will be useful  in
elaborating  the  macroeconomic  framework. However,  the  Bank  and
the  Fund  differ  with regard  to objectives  and  priorities. For
these  reasons  the  Bank  must form  its  own  judgment  of the- 35  -
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consistency  of the  short-term  stabilization  component  as  well as
the  medium-term  structural  policy  reforms. Given  that  the  Fund
has  an increasingly  mixed  record  to its  programs  achieving  their
objectives,  it is  also  not sufficient  for  the  Bank to rely  on a
Fund  program  to ensure  that  stabilization  policies  are
adequately  implemented.
(b)  Realism  of  Projections.  A frequent  shortcoming  of recent
adjustment  programs  is  excessive  optimism  about:  (i)  the  level
of resources  needed  and investment  required  for  switching  to
occur  and  growth  to be restored;  and (ii)  the  lag  between  policy
change  and  response  of economic  agents  (i.e.,  even  where
adequate  resources  are  available,  investment  and  growth  may  not
occur  given  uncertainties  about  the  lag  structure  in a  number  of
key  areas). Lack  of realism  has frequently  led  to underfunded
programs  which  are  reflected  in  either  excessive  compression  of
absorption  (most  frequently  of investment)  or in substantial
divergence  between  unrealistic  ex  ante  program  objectives  and
ex post  macroeconomic  performance  in  which  external  balance  is
achieved  at the  expense  of internal  balance  and  growth.
(c)  Focus  on a Few  Key  Policy  Conditions  (Avoidance  of "Christmas
Tree'  Effect). Macro  conditionality  in  both  SALs  and  SECALs
should  focus  on a few  key  conditions.  These  conditions  should,
as  appropriate,  be time-bound,  legally  binding  and  as
specific/precise/quantitative  as possible  so that  there  is  no
ambiguity  about  the  Bank's  commitment  to implementation  of the
key  r  roeconomic  policy  conditions.  An excessive  number  of
conditions  which  dilute  the  key  conditions  may in  practice  make
it  more difficult  for  the  Bank  to  use  its  leverage  to support
policy  reform  in  key  areas  (e.g.,  if 75  of the  80 conditions  of
an Agricultural  SECAL  have  been  implemented,  the  Bank  may appear
to be unreasonable  if it  does  not agree  to second  tranche
release  even  though  a few  macroeconomic  conditions  --  albeit  key
ones --  have  not been met).
(d)  Need to  Record  and  Monitor  Implementation  of  Macroeconomic
Component  of  Adjustment  Program. Agreement  between  the  Bank  and
the  AL country  on specific  elements  of the  macroeconomic  program
should  be recorded  for  all  SALs  and  SECALs  so that  there  exists
a point  of reference  for  monitoring  subsequent  macroeconomic
performance. This  should  be done  in sufficient  detail  that  key
elements  of the  macroeconomic  program  are  made explicit.
Without  this (i.e.,  that  the  Bank  generally  "is  satisfied"  with
implementation  progress),  there  is a  danger  that insufficient
weight  will be given  to ensuring  implementation  of key
macroeconomic  conditions  and  excessive  weight  will  be given  to
other  objectives  such  as avoiding  a negative  net  transfer  and
fulfilling  lending  targets.- 37 -
(e)  Proper  Sequencing  of Structural  Adjustment  Measures. Since  some
components  of an  adjustment  program  will be ineffective  or  will
have  perverse  effects  if  they  are  not  preceded  by improvements
in  macroeconomic  pe:formance,  proper  sequencing  in  the  design  of
adjustment  programs  is important. For  example,  efforts  to bring
about  shifts  in relative  prices  are  unlikely  to be effective  if
high  and  volatile  rates  of inflation  exist  or are  expected
(relative  price  signals  will be swamped  by the  general  price
increase  and  will  not induce  the  desired  switching  response).
Similarly  some  sectoral  adjustment  objectives  will be Impossible
to achieve  if they  are  not  preceded  by adequate  macroeconomic
policies  and  institutional  reforms. Efforts  to liberalize  the
financial  sector  (reduction  of reserve  requirements,  elimination
of forced  holding  of government  paper,  liberalization  of
interest  rates  and  relaxation  of cumbersome  banking  regulations)
are  unlikely  to be successful  unless  the  government's  fP cal
deficit  is under  control,  inflation  (and inflationar;
expectations)  has  been reduced  to a  manageable  level  and
administration  of the  commercial  bank  regulation  framework  has
been improved.
(f)  Sequencing  of Stabilization  Policies. Macroeconomic  policies
themselves  must be  properly  sequenced  if  they  are  to  have the
desired  effect. For  example,  freeing  of interest  rates  before
large  fiscal  deficits  are  brought  under  control,  the  exchange
rate  regime  is liberalized  and  inflationary  expectations  are
broken,  is likely  to result  in excessively  high  real  rates  of
interest  which  are  inconsistent  with  efforts  to reduce  the
fiscal  deficit  and  to reestablish  an  adequate  rate  of economic
growth. Similarly,  current  account  deficits  in the  balance  of
payments  must  be brought  under  control,  interest  rates
liberalized  and  a  more  market  determined  exchange  rate  be put in
place  before  the  capital  account  can  be opened. Otherwise,
destabilizing  capital  flows  (capital  flight  if real  interest
rates  are  negative  in real  terms  or  massive,  destabilizing
capital  inflows  if  real interest  rates  are  high and  the  exchange
rate  is fixed)  which  make it difficult  for  the  government  to
achieve  its  other  macroeconomic  objectives  are  likely  to occur.
(g)  Relationship  between  Stabilization  and  Financial  Sector  Reform.
The  financial  sector  is  a  primary  conduit  of  macroeconomic
policy  with the  rest  of the  economy. Conflict  often  arises  when
high  real  interest  rates  are  part  of the  stabilization  process
since  they  can  result  in financial  distress  of  borrowers  and
generalized  deterioration  of portfolio  quality  across  the
financial  sector.  If this  problem  becomes  acute,  restructuring
and  recapitalizing  the  financial  sector  becomes  necessary  and
this  can  undermine  the  fiscal  restraint  necessary  to achieve
stabilization  objectives.- 38  -
(h)  Reducing  the  Supply  Response  Lag. Productive  sectors  respond
with lags  to changed  incentives;  these  lags  vary  between  sectors
because  of their  technology  and  institutions.  Lags are  apt  to
be especially  long  during  the  period  of stabilization.  A key
issue  is  how to design  adjustment  programs  so  that institutional
reform  and  sectoral  policy  are  used  to enhance  sectoral  supply
response.
(i)  Use of  Heterodox  Macroeconomic  Adjustment  Policies. Use  of
"heterodox"  measures  in stabilization  programs  is  an important
consideration  in  program  design. Heterodox  approaches  used  by
countries  experiencing  chronic  inflation,  such  as Brazil  (Plan
Cruzado)  and  Argentina  (Plan  Austral),  initially  appeared  to  be
successful  in arresting  the  inertia  of rising  prices  without
sacrificing  growth. Such  approaches  focus  on  use of  price
controls  (wage,  price  and in  some  cases  exchange  policies),  to
slow  inflation  and  to  control  expectations.  The  conclusion  from
these  experiences  is  that  while  heterodox  measures  can  help to
overcome  inertial  inflation  and  can  be an effective  tool  in
managing  inflationary  expectations,  they  are  unlikely  to be
successful  unless  they  are supported  by orthodox  stabilization
policies,  especially  by tight  fiscal  management.
(j)  Need for  Contingency  Mechanism  for  Responding  to External
Shocks. An important  issue  in program  design  is  use  of a
contingency  mechanism  in  targeting  net international  reserves.
If this  variable  is  to  be targeted,  there  is  need for  a
contingency  mechanism  to isolate  the  effect  on  net international
reserves  of temporary  external  shocks. In  the  absence  of such  a
safeguard  there  is  a danger  that  rolling  adjustment  program
targets  will be tightened  excessively  in response  to external
shocks  and  that  this  will  derail  efforts  to reestablish  growth.
(k)  Real  vs.  Nomincl  Targets. If  nominal  targets  are  used  and  the
inflation  target  is  missed.  all  other  nominal,  targets  become
irrelevant. Since  inflation  is  not  controlled  by any  one  policy
instrument,  but is  the  outcome  of  many simultaneous  forces
(i.e.,  the  result  of both  policy  intervention  and  exogenous
shocks),  including  expectations  about  future  inflation,
forecasting  of future  inflation  r  tes  is exceedingly  imprecise.
This  is particularly  true  of  the  high  and  volatile  inflationary
situations  in  many  of the  middle  income  high  debt  countries  at
present. However,  if real  targets  are  used there  remains  the
problem  of selecting  the  appropriate  nominal  anchor. Currently
there  is  no clear  consensus  within  the  economics  profession  or.
this  point. This  subject  is  one  of the  major  priorities  of
future  macroeconomic  policy  research.- 39 -
(1)  Dealing  with the  Debt  Overhang. There  are  important  issues  of
program  design  which  stem  from  a large  debt  overhang. Service
payments  on external  debt  require  a twin  transfer  of resources
(external  and  domestic). Because  the  public  sector  is
ultimately  responsible  for  servicing  the  external  debt,  but
savings  are  usually  being  generated  in  the  private  sector,  there
is a  need  to transfer  resources  from  the  private  to  the  public
sector. Because  there  are limits  on the  size  of transfer  which
can  be achieved,  many  highly-indebted  countries  end  up resorting
to  use  of the  inflation  tax.  In such  circumstances  the
government  may  have  to resort  to  use  of high  real  interest  rates
to induce  the  public  to  hold  government  paper. As a
consequence,  many  highly-indebted  countries  have  experienced
excessively  high rates  of interest  for  long  periods  of time
which  have the  effect  of  crowding  out  private  investment  and
impeding  resumption  of growth. This  has frequently  eroded  the
sustainability  of adjustment  programs. If  not  dealt  with
directly,  the  problem  is likely  to  become  more severe  with  time.
There  are solutions  to these  problems  but  their  implementation
is  usually  difficult. One  solution  is to cut  Government
expenditures.  The  difficulty  with  this  is that  in  practice
investment  spending  is  usually  the  easiest  to  cut. While  it is
possible  to identify  some  public  sector  investments  which  should
not  be undertaken,  further  investment  cuts  beyond  this  may  make
it  more  difficult  to  carry  out  switching  and  to resume  sustained
growth. The  conclusion  is  that  sustainability  of adjustment
programs  will depend  upon  proper  handling  of the  debt
restructuring  process. For  some  countries,  debt  reduction  is a
sine  qua  non  of program  design  if  the  adjustment  program  is  to
succeed.- 40 -
APPENDLX
Coding,  Conditionality  and  Implementation
The  tables  in this  paper  are  based  on the  Bank's  Industry  and
Energy  Department  (IENIN)  Adjustment  Lending  Conditionality  and  Implementation
Database  (ALCID). The  sample  covers  184  adjustment  loans  to  61 countries.
Twenty-six  of these  countries  had  three  or  more adjustment  loans  during  the
1980-89  period9. For  each  given  country  adjustment  program,  two sorts  of
information  were considered: (1)  the  specific  conditions  attached  to each
Bank-supported  program;  and,  where  available,  (2)  the  implementation  status,
or  extent  to  which  these  conditions  have  been  fulfilled. The  conditionality
and  implementation  were classified  according  to general  information  about  a
given  loan  and  a given  borrower  (for  example,  the  fiscal  year  and  the  dollar
amount  of the  loan)  and  to  more specific  information  about  each  condition.
The  sources  of information  on  conditionality  were legal  agreements  and
President's  Reports.
Characteristics  of conditions  were coded  on six  dimensions:
(1)  firmness,  whether  a condition  is  precisely  specific  and  perhaps
quantifiable;  (2)  legality,  whether  the  legal  agreement  requires  the  condition
for  disbursement;  (3)  timebound,  whether  a condition  has to  be fulfilled
within  a given  timeframe;  (4)  importance,  whether  the  ALCID  coder  considered  a
condition  central  to the  adjustment  process;  (5)  policy  area;  and
(6)  performance  objective. Pakistan's  1989  Financial  Sector  Adjustment  Loan
provides  an example  of a  condition  which  is specific,  legally-binding  for
second  tranche  release,  timebound  and  important: "reduce  the  government's
budget  deficit  to 6.5Z  of GDP  in  FY89.n
The  data  on implementation  indicates  the  extent  to  which  a
condition  was fulfilled  at last  tranche  release  (during  the  lifetime  of a
loan)  at loan  completion  report,  and  current  status  (Summer  1988  or Spring
1989). In the  184  country-program  sample,  only  97 loans  have  been  in  place
long  enough  to  have any  information  on implementation.  The sources  of
informatior.  on implementation  were  mainly  supervision  reports,  tranche  release
documents,  and  where  available,  Project  Completion  Reports  and  Program
Performance  Audit  Reports. These  sources  were supplemented  by additional
information  obtained  from  Bank  staff  familiar  with the  country's  adjustment
program. While  the  coding  resulted  from  subjective  judgments,  there  were
several  checks  at each  stage  to assure  consistency  of standards.
9  In  Asia  --  Indonesia,  Korea,  and  the  Philippines;  in  Europe,  the  Middle
East  and  North  Africa  --  Morocco,  Pakistan,  Tunisia,  Turkey  and  Yugoslavia;  in
Latin  America  and the  Caribbean  region  --  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile,
Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Jamaica,  Mexico  and  Uruguay;  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  --  Code
d'Ivoire,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Malawi,  Nigeria,  Senegal,  Tanzania  and  Zambia.- 41 -
The  implementation  of each  was graded: (1)  little  or  no
progress;  (2)  moderate  progress  (some  steps  taken  but  not  much  progress);
(3)  significant  progress  (substantial  steps  taken  to  move  progress  more than
half-way);  (4)  implementation  fulfilled;  and (5)  implementation  more than
fulfilled.
Such  a grading  process  has  its  limitations.  First,  it involves
judgment;  the  appropriate  "grade"  was  not  always  clear. Second,  while  full
implementation  is  a desirable  objective  ex ante,  it  may  not always  remain
desirable. Both  economic  and  political  circumstances  can  change  unexpectedly,
causing  a shift  in  policy  instruments  to fit  the  changed  economic  environment.
Third,  it is  worth  noting  that  the  grading  process  does  not consider  whether
conditions  differ.  in their  implementation  difficulty  and  the  strength  of their
impact  on the  economy 1 o.
10 In  this  regard,  we have  considered  as  well  descriptive  information  drawn
from  PCRs  and  PPARs,  which  goes  behind  aggregate  data.PRE  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
ALhor  for pa2e
WPS496  Issues  in Evaluating  Tax and  Robert  Conrad  August  1990  A. Bhalla
Paymer.t  Arrangements  for Publicly  Zmarak  Shalizi  37699
Owned  Minerals  Janet  Syme
WPS497 The  Measurement  of Budgetary  Carlos  Elbirt  August  1990  T. Gean
Operations  in Highly  Distorted  34247
Economies:  The  Case  of Angola
WPS498  The  Build,  Operate,  and  Transfer  Mark  Augenblick  August  1990  D. Schein
('BOT') Approach  to Infrastructure  B. Scott Custer,  Jr.  70291
Projects  in Developing  Countries
WPS499  Taxing  Foreign  Income  in Capital-  Chad  Leechor  September  1990  A. Bhalla
Importing  Countries:  Thailand's  Jack M. Mintz  37699
Perspective
WPS500  Projecting  Fertility  for All Countries  Eduard  Bos  September  1990  V. Altfeld
Rodolfo  A. Bulatao  31091
WPS501  Tax  Systems  in the Reforming  Cheryl  W.  Gray  September  1990  L. Lockyear
Socialist  Economies  of Europe  36969
WPS502  Patents  and  Pharmaceutical  Drugs:  Julio  Nogu6s  September  1990  M. T. Sanchez
Understanding  the Pressures  on  33731
Developing  Countries
WPS503  Household  Production,  Time  John  Dagsvik  September  1990  M.  Abundo
Allocation,  and  Wehare  in Peru  Rolf  Aaberge  36820
WPS504 Applying  Tax  Policy  Models  in  Henrik  Dahl  September  1990  A. Bhalla
Country  Economic  Work:  Pradeep  Mitra  37699
Bangladesh,  China,  and India
WPS505 Creating  the Reform-Resistant  Arye  L. Hillman  September  1990  CECSE  Staff
Dependent  Economy:  The  CMEA  Adi Schnytzer  37176
International  Trading  Relationship
WPS506  Changes  in Food  Consumption  Merlinda  D. Ingco  September  1990  A. Daruwala
Patterns  in  the Republic  of Korea  33713
WPS507  Poverty  in Poland,  Hungary,  and  Branko  Milanovic  September  1990  A. Bretana
Yugoslavia  in the Years  of Crisis,  37176
1978-87
WPS508 A RMSM-X  Model  for  Chile  Luis  Serven  September  1990  S. Jonnakuty
39074
WPSSO9 The  Childbeanng  Family  in  Odile  Frank  September  1990  B.  Rosa
Sub-Saharan  Africa: Structure,  33751
Fertility,  and  the FuturePRE  Working  Pager  Seriea
Contact
Tidi  AtAhor  Da  for paper
WPS510  Public  Expenditure  Reviews  for  Antoine  Schwartz  October  1990  C. Cristobal
Education:  The Bank's  Experience  Gail Stevenson  33640
WPS511  The  Macroeconomic  Underpinnings  Fred  Jaspersen  October  1990  A. Oropesa
of Adjustment  Lending  Karim  Shariff  39075
WPS512
WPS513
WPS514  Restrictive  Labor  Practices  in  Alan  S. Harding  October  1990  A. Joseph
Seaports  33743